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I. INTRODUCTION

Forty years ago, Congress passed many of the nation’s federal
environmental laws. Congress and state legislatures recognized the
growing environmental damage occurring in the country and passed
laws restricting the actions of businesses, individuals, and government
entities. One of the hallmarks of these environmental laws is the growth
of permitting programs. Acknowledging that a halt to all pollution and
development was both impractical and undesirable, governments
developed programs to minimize, monitor, and mitigate environmental
harms. Over the past forty years, private organizations have been
increasingly involved in these permitting programs. For example,
* Associate Professor, SUNY–Buffalo Law School. Thanks to Kalyani Robbins for organizing
Akron’s symposium on the Next Generation of Environmental & Natural Resources Law. The
lively discussions and questions improved this piece and my thinking about the future of
environmental law generally. Suggestions from Eric Biber, Fred Cheever, and Robin Craig were
particularly helpful for this Article and future planned work. As is often the case, Adena R.
Rissman provided helpful suggestions and caught embarrassing errors. I am in her debt.
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through conservation easements and mitigation banks, private businesses
and nonprofit organizations have taken on the responsibilities of
monitoring and enforcing environmental permits.
This article examines the increasing privatization of environmental
law by taking a close look at mitigation measures in permitting
programs. As mitigation has become an increasingly important element
of permitting programs, permitting agencies have looked for outside
organizations to help design, monitor, and enforce the mitigation
projects. Thus, compensatory mitigation projects provide a good lens
for examining the role of private organizations in environmental law.
There are good reasons for drawing on the power of private
organizations. They can provide flexibility and expertise as well as
increased capacity. However, concerns regarding democracy and
accountability arise when government agencies hand off duties to private
actors. It is not clear that the private organizations have adequate
oversight, and there are no clear mechanisms for stepping in when these
organizations fail to perform (or inadequately perform) their
conservation duties. This increasing privatization has largely occurred
without a public debate regarding who is the appropriate entity to carry
out and enforce environmental law. The privatization has gone
unnoticed and under examined. Environmental conservation is a public
duty, and we should be concerned with the increasing privatization of
that task.
II. THE RISE OF COMPENSATORY MITIGATION
A.

Background

Mitigation is a key element of most environmental and land-use
permitting programs. 1 Many environmental laws appear to prohibit
environmental degradation outright, but then contain provisions allowing
for environmentally destructive activities after obtaining appropriate
permits. 2 Permit programs generally require that permit applicants
1. See, e.g., Margaret S. Race & Mark S. Fonseca, Fixing Compensatory Mitigation: What
Will It Take?, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 94 (1996) (describing the rise of compensatory
mitigation in the wetlands context); Robert Bonnie, Endangered Species Mitigation Banking:
Promoting Recovery Through Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act,
240 THE SCI. OF THE TOTAL ENV’T 11 (1999) (describing mitigation for loss of endangered species
habitat); Jeanne S. White, Beating Plowshares into Townhomes: The Loss of Farmland and
Strategies for Slowing its Conversion to Nonagricultrual Uses, 28 ENVTL. L. 113 (1998) (discussing
mitigation for loss of agricultural land).
2. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
7401-7671 (2010); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000) (originally enacted in
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avoid, minimize, and mitigate environmental harms arising from their
proposed project. 3
This section offers two example mitigation programs to illustrate
how mitigation programs arose and to outline their general structure.
The following section demonstrates the increasing privatization of
mitigation programs and the concerns associated with that privatization.
Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, permittees receive
permission to alter wetlands in exchange for promises to mitigate harm
from that wetland alteration. 4 Similarly, Section 10 of the Endangered
Species Act creates a permit program for incidental takes of endangered
species. 5 Under Section 10, developers can avoid criminal charges for
violations of the take prohibition (i.e., harming individuals of a species
or altering species’ critical habitat) by creating a Habitat Conservation
Plan and receiving a Section 10 incidental take permit. 6 The Habitat
Conservation Plan must outline plans to mitigate any negative impacts
on species. 7 These two major environmental laws place mitigation
projects at the center of their environmental protection schemes.
B.

Examples
1. The Clean Water Act’s Section 404 Permitting Program

The objective of the Clean Water Act is to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s waters.8 In
an effort to achieve that objective, the Clean Water Act limits the ability
to discharge pollutants into waters of the United States.9 Through
Section 404, the statute seeks to prevent discharge of dredged or fill
materials into wetlands within the Clean Water Act’s jurisdiction.10 To
legally dredge or fill a wetland that comes under federal jurisdiction, one

1973); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Regulations, 40 C.F.R §§ 239-282 (2013).
3. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 1508.20 (2013) (defining mitigation for operations under the
National Environmental Policy Act); Morgan Robertson & Palmer Hough, Wetlands Regulation:
The Case of Mitigation Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, in WETLANDS 171 (B.A. LePage
ed. 2011); Stephen M. Johnson, Avoid, Minimize, Mitigate: The Continuing Constitutionality of
Wetlands Mitigation After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 689 (1995).
4. 33 U.S.C. § 1344.
5. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a).
6. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B).
7. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii) & (v).
8. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
9. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).
10. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2).
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must first obtain a Section 404 permit. 11 These permits (issued by the
Army Corps of Engineers with coordination and oversight from the
Environmental Protection Agency) require project proponents to avoid,
minimize, and mitigate the harms of any wetland destruction or
modification. 12 The Army Corps rarely denies these permits and while
the EPA has the authority under Section 404(c) to veto permits that it
feels are not adequately protective of the environment, it rarely does
so. 13
When granting Section 404 permits, the Corps requires project
proponents to mitigate any damage occurring to wetlands caused by the
project. Indeed, with a national policy of no net loss of wetlands,
mitigation is imperative. 14 Mitigation comes in three categories:
avoidance, minimization, and compensation. 15 First, permit applicants
(usually developers) must avoid any harm to wetlands. 16 Next, they

11. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). As the Supreme Court has instructed, not all wetlands fall under the
Clean Water Act’s scope. The debate over jurisdictional wetlands has been prevalent in the courts
and academic literature, and I will not enter the fray here. For more details and discussion, see
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (detailing the history of the Court’s jurisprudence
regarding the term “waters of the United States”); U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, REVISED
GUIDANCE ON CLEAN WATER ACT JURISDICTION FOLLOWING THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN
RAPANOS
V.
U.S.
AND
CARABELL
V.
U.S.
(2008),
available
at
http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/regulatory/cwa_guide/cwa_juris_2dec08.pdf;
Margaret “Peggy” Strand & Lowell M. Rothschild, What Wetlands Are Regulated? Jurisdiction of
the §404 Program, 40 ENVTL. L. RPTR. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10372 (2010) (providing detailed
information about Section 404 cases); Mark Squillace, From “Navigable Waters” to
“Constitutional Waters”: The Future of Federal Wetlands Regulations, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
799 (2007); Jonathan H. Adler, Reckoning with Rapanos: Revisiting “Waters of the United States”
and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 14 Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2006); Patrick
Parenteau, Bad Calls: How Corps’ Districts are Making Up Their Own Rules of Jurisdiction Under
the Clean Water Act, 6 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2004-2005); Kim Diana Connolly, Keeping Wetlands
Wet: Are Existing Protections Enough?, 6 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 169 (2004-2005).
12. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a); Connolly, supra note 11 at 174-175; Palmer Hough & Morgan
Robertson, Mitigation under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act” Where it Comes From, What it
Means, 17 WETLANDS ECOLOGY & MGMT. 15, 16 (2009).
13. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c); Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 850 F.Supp.2d
133, 139-43 (D.D.C. 2012). Clean Water Act Section 404(C) “Veto Authority,” ENVTL PROT.
AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/cwa/dredgdis/404c_index.cfm (last visited Oct.
19, 2012); see also Squillace, supra note 11, at n.11; Jessica Owley, Privatizing Wetlands
Mitigation, in BEYOND JURISDICTION: WETLANDS POLICY FOR THE NEXT GENERATION (Kim
Connolly ed. forthcoming 2014); Hough & Robertson, supra note 12, at 27 (explaining the rarity of
permit denials).
U.S.
DEPT.
OF
AGRICULTURE,
14. Wetlands,
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/water/wetlands/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2012)
(explaining President George H.W. Bush’s 1989 adoption of the “no net loss” policy).
15. Johnson, supra note 3, at 695.
16. Id.
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must design their project to minimize any harm. 17 Finally, the
developers must compensate for any harm still expected to occur after
avoidance and minimization.18 The third category of mitigation,
compensatory mitigation, is a troubling concept because it acknowledges
wetland destruction will occur. 19 Instead of preventing wetland
conversion, developers compensate for the wetlands lost.20 Most efforts
of wetland protection appear focused on compensation, often neglecting
the avoidance and minimization requirements.21
Corps regulations set forth four acceptable compensatory mitigation
strategies: restoration, establishment, enhancement, and preservation.22
These are relatively straightforward sounding approaches but can be
challenging to implement. 23 Establishment (or creation) requires
building a wetland out of whole cloth where one did not exist before.24
Wetland creation has been beset by a variety of problems with many
failed projects. 25 Restoration takes an existing but degraded wetland and
increases its function by doing things like removing debris and invasive
species, planting wetlands species, and ensuring adequate water
supplies. 26 This is linked to enhancement, which also starts with an
existing wetland and increases its functions.27 The difference between
restoration and enhancement is that they come from different starting
points. Enhanced wetlands tend to be healthy functioning ecosystems

17. Id.
18. Wetland Regulatory Authority, THE WETLAND FACT SHEET SERIES (EPA, Washington,
DC), available at http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/outreach/upload/reg_authority.pdf (last visited
Dec. 14, 2012); Clean Water Act Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 230.91(c)(2) (West
2013).
19. WILLIAM J. MITSCH & JAMES GOSSELINK, WETLANDS 379-80 (4th ed. 2007).
20. Todd BenDor, Nicholas Brozovic, & Varkki George Pallathucerhril, The Social Impacts
of Wetland Mitigation Policies in the United States, 22 J. PLANNING LITERATURE 341, 342 (2008).
21. See Hough & Robertson, supra note 12, at 29.
22. 40 C.F.R. § 230.92.
23. See MITSCH & GOSSELINK, supra note 19, at 381-424.
24. Wetlands Compensatory Mitigation, E.P.A,
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/CMitigation.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2012).
25. See William J. Mitsch & Renee F. Wilson, Improving the Success of Wetland Creation
and Restoration with the Know-How, Time, and Self-Design, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 77
(1996); Dennis F. Whigham, Ecological Issues Related to Wetland Preservation, Restoration,
Creation ad Assessment, 240 SCI. TOTAL ENVT. 31 (1999); Hough & Robertson, supra note 12, at
24.
26. Wetlands Compensatory Mitigation, supra note 24; WILLIAM J. MITSCH & JAMES G.
GOSSELINK, supra note 19, at 377-424 (explaining different restoration techniques and strategies).
27. R.R. Lewis, Wetlands Restoration/Creation/Enhancement Terminology: Suggestions for
Standardization, in WETLAND CREATION AND RESTORATION: THE STATUS OF THE SCIENCE 417-22
(Jon A. Kusler & Mary E. Kentula eds., 1990) (describing the different wetlands terms and offering
a glossary).
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with capacity for even higher quality environmental protection than they
are currently providing while restoration projects usually start with
rather degraded parcels. Restoration and enhancement projects have
largely fared better than creation projects, and understandings of
restoration ecology are improving the outcomes for all of these
projects. 28 Yet, restoration projects provide fewer acres and fewer
functions than ecologists had predicted. 29 After creating, restoring, or
enhancing wetlands, the wetlands themselves are usually protected with
conservation easements with the hopes of keeping the wetlands from
being degraded or converted again in the future.30
The final option for compensatory mitigation is preservation.31
Preservation involves protecting existing wetlands in exchange for
destroying wetlands. 32 Preservation of wetlands can occur either by
securing fee simple ownership of wetlands and then ensuring that the
wetlands will be protected from development and conversion or by
securing conservation easements over wetlands. 33 The Corps works
with the applicant to determine the correct ratio of destroyed versus
protected wetlands.34 The option to use preservation as a mitigation
option is particularly unsatisfying because, as even the EPA
acknowledges, it results in a net loss of wetlands. 35 Preservation on its
own does not increase wetland function or acreage. It accepts a decrease
in both as worth the benefit that will be supplied by the development
project.
The Clean Water Act did not originally involve mitigation in its
permitting program. 36 Initially, it was thought that if proposed projects
were likely to lead to ecosystem disruption, the permits associated with
28. See Anya Hopple & Christopher Craft, Managed Disturbance Enhances Biodiversity of
Restored Wetlands in the Agricultural Midwest, ECOLOGICAL ENG’G (In press 29 March 2012); Joy
B. Zedler & Suzanne Kercher, Wetland Resources: Status, Trends, Ecosystem Services,
Degradation, and Restorability, 30 ANN. REV. ENVT. & RESOURCES 39, 60 (2005).
29. See David Malakoff, Restored Wetlands Flunk Real-World Test, 280 SCI. 371 (1999)
(noting struggles but suggesting that given enough time the projects might end up more successful
than currently being demonstrated).
30. Jessica Fox & Anamaria Nino-Murcia, Status of Species Conservation Banking in the
United States, 19 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 996, 997 (2005).
31. 40 C.F.R. § 230.92 (West 2013).
32. See Robert E. Beck, The Movement in the United States to Restoration and Creation of
Wetlands, 34 NAT. RES. J. 781, 798 (1994).
33. Wetlands Compensatory Mitigation, supra note 24.
34. James T. Robb, Assessing Wetland Compensatory Mitigation Sites to Aid in Establishing
Mitigation Ratios, 22 WETLANDS 435, 439 (2002).
35. Wetlands Compensatory Mitigation, supra note 24.
36. The EPA and the Corps added mitigation requirements to their Section 404(b)(1),
Guidelines in 1990, codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 230.
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those projects would be denied.37
However, Congress quickly
acknowledged that it would be politically undesirable to deny many
permits (particularly for popular projects). 38 Thus, there was a perceived
need to issue permits to facilitate such projects alongside a desire to
lessen potential harm from those projects.39 Without a flexible permit
program, the extensive network of wetlands in this country might
prevent desired development. Congress acknowledged that it was not in
the public interest to stop all development for the sake of improving
water quality. 40 Some water pollution can be an acceptable exchange for
the benefits gained from development projects like homes, roads, and
hospitals. Thus, instead of prohibiting development, the Clean Water
Act seeks to minimize development’s impacts on wetlands. Issuing a
permit with conditions embodies an assessment that the remaining
unavoidable impacts are acceptable. That is, the Corps (and the EPA)
believes that the benefits of the development project outweigh the harm
to the wetlands.
Programs for compensatory mitigation wetlands take three forms:
(1) permittee-driven, (2) mitigation banks, or (3) in lieu programs. 41
Permittee-driven mitigation, which is the largest category of projects,
involves the permit applicant establishing her own mitigation program. 42
She arranges the mitigation projects, usually with the help of outside
consultants and government agencies. The permittee arranges for the
conservation easements involved, often through negotiation with a land
trust. 43 Such conservation easements may burden land owned by the
37. Richard F. Ambrose, Wetlands Mitigation in the United States: Assessing the Success of
Mitigation Policies, 19 WETLANDS (AUSTRALIA) 1, 2-5 (2000) (detailing the development of
wetlands mitigation policies); Hough & Robertson, supra note 12, at 17.
38. See Hough & Robertson, supra note 12, at 17 (arguing that the allowing general permits
“was an acknowledgement that Congress intended the 404 program to allow large numbers of
permitted impacts which damaged wetlands”).
39. Robertson & Hough, supra note 3, at 174.
40. The mere existence of numerous permit programs demonstrates this.
41. Wetlands Compensatory Mitigation, supra note 24.
42. Id.; Adrienne M. Sakyi, Mitigation Banking: Is State Assumption of Permitting Authority
More Effective?, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1027, 1032 (2010); Hough &
Robertson, supra note 12, at 24. The ease of structuring one’s own mitigation program, lack of
availability of mitigation credits, and preferences for on-site and in-kind mitigation may explain
why most mitigation projects are permittee-driven.
43. Under state law, conservation easements can usually be held by governmental entities
and land trusts, with some varying constraints on the type of agency that can hold the conservation
easement and requirements of land trust holders. Under permitting schemes, public agencies may
hold conservation easements as well. This article examines the concerns arising when the
conservation easements are held by land trusts, but when a public agency uses conservation
easements we also have a unique host of concerns. While public agency actions are more easily
reviewed or challenged than the actions of private organizations, traditional agency analysis shifts
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permittee or permittees may purchase conservation easements on others’
property. The role of land trusts and conservation easements is
discussed in more detail below. 44
When compensatory mitigation occurs through mitigation banks,
the permittee purchases the appropriate number of credits (as determined
by the Corps) from a bank (deemed acceptable by the Corps).45 State
and federal laws govern mitigation banks, which are also subject to
mitigation bank agreements. 46 Such banks may be owned and operated
by for-profit companies, nonprofit organizations, or state agencies. 47
Where privately owned, the land in the banks is encumbered with
conservation easements to ensure long-term protection. 48
In-lieu programs involve government agencies (or sometimes
nonprofit organizations) conducting mitigation projects. 49 In such cases,
permittees pay fees directly to a natural resource agency (or nonprofit)
that then uses the money to implement wetlands protection projects. 50
The strength of in-lieu programs is that the program manager can pool
money from multiple permittees to work on larger, more comprehensive
projects. 51 As with the mitigation banking, in-lieu compensatory
mitigation also occurs off site.
Many wetland mitigation projects rely on private actors to create,
maintain, and steward the projects. This is particularly true for
preservation projects and wherever conservation easements are used.
Preservation as mitigation relies heavily on private actors for
enforcement because government agencies tend to be reluctant to hold
the conservation easements and monitor the land in perpetuity.
Increasingly, nonprofit organizations, known as land trusts, oversee the
preserved wetlands and aquatic resources. 52
when the agency operates by contract (as with a conservation easement or mitigation banking
agreement) instead of using it regulatory authority. The shift to contract law raises questions about
reviewability and public participation. See Mark Aronson, A Public Lawyer’s Response to
Privatization and Outsourcing, in THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 40 (Michael Taggart
ed., 1997).
44. See infra section III.B.2.
45. Wetlands Compensatory Mitigation, supra note 24.
46. See Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use, and Operation of Mitigation Banks, 60
REG.
58,
605
at
58,
613
(Nov.
28,
1995),
available
at
FED.
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/mitbankn.cfm.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Wetlands Compensatory Mitigation, supra note 24.
50. Federal Guidance, supra note 46, at 58,613.
51. Jessica Wilkinson, In-lieu Fee Mitigation: Coming Into Compliance with the New
Compensatory Mitigation Rule, 17 WETLANDS ECOLOGY & MGMT 53 (2009).
52. See, e.g., Wetlands Protection: Partnering with Land Trusts, E.P.A,
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2. The Endangered Species Act
The Endangered Species Act has a similar permitting scheme. In
1973, Congress passed the Endangered Species Act. 53 The Act
establishes a program to protect threatened and endangered species and
the ecosystems upon which they depend. 54 Federal protection for a
species commences once the Department of the Interior lists the species
in the Federal Register as either threatened or endangered. 55 Section 9
of the Act prohibits any person from “taking” any listed wildlife or fish
species. 56 Under the Act, “take” includes “harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect.” 57 Harm is further defined
in agency regulations as including “significant habitat modification
where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing
essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or
sheltering.” 58 With these definitions, the prohibition on taking species
prevents many actions that involve land conversion or development.
In 1982, Congress responded to growing protests from developers
by amending the Endangered Species Act to provide partial relief from
the Section 9 ban on habitat modification.59 Acknowledging a need to
balance economic pressures and species preservation, Congress designed
a framework to foster “creative partnerships” between the public and
private sectors and state, municipal, and federal agencies. 60 The
amendments added Section 10 to the Act, authorizing the Secretaries of
Commerce and the Interior to issue incidental take permits.61 These
permits allow landowners to develop their land even when the land
provides habitat to listed species, as long as the taking of individual
members of the species is “incidental to, and not the purpose of, the
carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.” 62
To obtain an incidental take permit, applicants must submit a

http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/outreach/upload/landtrust-pr.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2013).
53. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000) (originally enacted in 1973). The Senate approved the
ESA 92-0. The House then approved a slightly altered version 355-4. President Nixon signed the
bill into law on December 28, 1973. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 844 (1973).
54. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b); Lara M. Bernstein, Ecosystem Communities: Zoning Principles to
Promote Conservation and the Economy, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1309, 1312 (1995).
55. Bernstein, supra note 54, at 1312.
56. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B).
57. Id. § 1532(19).
58. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (West 2013).
59. Pub. L. No. 97-304, 86 Stat. 1411 (1982).
60. H.R. Rep. No. 97-835, 97th Congress, 2d Sess. (1982).
61. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
62. Id.
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“comprehensive plan,” 63 also known as a Habitat Conservation Plan or
HCP. Section 10 explains that an HCP must (1) assess the impact on
listed species of the proposed activity, (2) analyze alternatives to the
proposed activity, (3) set out the steps to be taken to minimize and
mitigate the impact, and (4) describe the funding available to implement
such steps. 64 The regulations define mitigation to include:
a)

Avoiding the impact altogether by not taking a certain action or
parts of an action.
b) Minimizing impacts by limiting the degree or magnitude of the
action and its implementation.
c) Rectifying the impact by repairing, rehabilitating, or restoring
the affected environment.
d) Reducing or eliminating the impact over time by preservation
and maintenance operations during the life of the action.
e) Compensating for the impact by replacing or providing
substitute resources or environments. 65

This definition follows the contours of Clean Water Act mitigation
discussed above but with a slightly different approach. First, unlike the
Section 404 scheme, there is no stated preference for mitigation types.
Arguably, avoidance and minimization of harm are pre-mitigation
strategies. That is, a project proponent should begin by avoiding all
possible harm. Where avoidance is impossible, the applicant should
minimize the likely harm. The remaining impacts are the ones the
applicant should then mitigate (or compensate) for. The Endangered
Species Act does not detail the mitigation as clearly as the Clean Water
Act does. Thus, (c), (d), and (e) contain elements of compensatory
mitigation for remaining harms.
Because these regulations still do not provide detail about what
HCP mitigation projects should look like and how the HCP process
should work, the Services provided detail in the jointly issued HCP
Handbook in 1996. 66 This Handbook describes the process of mitigating
for habitat loss:
Potential types of habitat mitigation include, but are not limited to: (1)
acquisition of existing habitat; (2) protection of existing habitat
63. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(A).
64. Id. Additionally, the Secretary may require any other measures he deems necessary or
appropriate for purposes of the plan.
65. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.20 (2013).
66. UNITED STATES FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE AND NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE,
HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN HANDBOOK (1996) [hereinafter HCP HANDBOOK].
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through conservation easements or other legal instruments; (3)
enhancement or restoration of disturbed or former habitat; (4)
prescriptive management of habitat to achieve specific biological
67
characteristics; and (5) creation of new habitats.

Note that some of these mitigation options do not lead to increased
habitat; both (1) and (2) are just protecting already-existing habitat. Yet,
a cursory investigation into HCP mitigation plans shows that
preservation of habitat (through fee simple ownership, conservation
easement, or deed restriction) is the most common mitigation
technique. 68
As with wetlands mitigation, private organizations are often heavily
involved in the creation, maintenance, and enforcement of mitigation
projects. Privately owned habitat mitigation banks are increasingly
popular ways to preserve or enhance existing habitat. Conservation
easements, often held by land trusts, have also played a fundamental role
in Endangered Species Act mitigation from the very first HCP in San
Bruno Mountain in 1986. 69
III. PRIVATIZATION OF MITIGATION
The preceding section introduced the basics of environmental
mitigation programs, setting forth the examples of wetland mitigation
under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act and habitat mitigation under
Section 10 of the Endangered Species Act. The involvement of private
actors in those schemes is pervasive and follows a general trend of
privatization with other governmental programs. This section provides
some of the broad contours of privatization of governmental services
with a discussion of programs associated with environmental permitting
before delving specifically into mitigation programs. Private actors are
involved in many areas of governmental decision making and service
provision. The role of privatization in mitigation may be less obvious
than elsewhere. I explain the extent to which private actors may become
involved in environmental policy making by overseeing mitigation
projects—a pattern that appears to be continually on the rise. After this
illustration of the phenomenon, the next section discusses some of the
benefits and drawbacks of turning to private actors to run mitigation
67. Id. at 3-21 to 3-22.
68. Id.
69. Jessica Owley, Exacted Conservation Easements: The Hard Case of Endangered Species
Protection, 19 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 293 (2004) [hereinafter Owley, Exacted Conservation
Easements].
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programs and presents questions to ask before allowing the trend to
continue.
A.

Background

Privatization of governmental services (also termed “contracting
out”) has been on the rise. 70 This has occurred for a variety of reasons.
In some cases, cash-strapped governments simply do not have the funds
or capacity to provide all the services they wish. Private companies and
organizations may offer a less expensive alternative. In other cases,
privatization appears more efficient because governments do not have
the relevant expertise or infrastructure. Many privatization projects arise
however because of efforts to shrink government and reduce
bureaucracy. 71
While privatization exists in most public sectors to some degree,
the most discussed examples occur with prisons, schools, hospitals and
the military. Private companies have been running prisons 72 and public
hospitals for many years now. 73 Charter schools serve as a privately run
public option in many school districts.74 Even the U.S. military has been
hiring private contractors to take on some of its duties. 75
Privatization is popping up in some unexpected areas. For
example, Kansas and Nebraska are among the states that have privatized
their child welfare programs. 76 Several states, including California, have
70. In this article, I use privatization to mean the increased governmental reliance on the
private sector, rather than on government agencies, to satisfy the needs of society. See E.S. Savas,
Privatization and Prisons, 40 VAND. L. REV. 889 (1987). Jody Freeman argues for a narrower use
of the term to refer only to turning over government property to private companies, organizations, or
individuals. Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative State, 52
ADMIN. L. REV. 813, 821-22 (2000). In Freeman’s parlance, what I am focusing on here is the
contracting out of government services. Contracting out is but one form of privatization but is the
main subject of this work.
71. Paul Starr, The Limits of Privatization, 36 PROCEEDINGS ACAD. POLITICAL SCI. 124, 126
(1987).
72. Savas, supra note 70; Mary Sigler, Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the Meaning
of Punishment, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. Rev. 149 (2010).
73. David U. Himmelstein & Steffie Woolhandler, Privatization in a Publicly Funded Health
Care System: The U.S. Experience, 38 INT’L J. HEALTH SVCS. 407 (2008).
74. GERALD BRACEY, THE WAR AGAINST AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS: PRIVATIZING
SCHOOLS, COMMERCIALIZING EDUCATION 101-102 (2002).
75. Mateo Taussig-Rubbo, Outsourcing Sacrifice: The Labor of Private Military
Contractors, 2 YALE J. L. & HUMANITIES 101 (2009) (arguing, among other things, that the hiring
of private military contractors enables the government to mask the true losses of life involved in
armed conflicts because the military contractors are not included in the body counts).
76. Luke Andrew Steven Demaree, “Tiny Little Shoes”: The Privatization of Child Welfare
Services in Kansas 69 UMKC L. REV. 643 (2000); Kevin O’Hanlon, Privatization Fails: Nebraska
Tries Again to Reform Child Welfare, CTR. FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (Aug. 21, 2012, 6:00 AM),
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privatized fraud prosecution, with private companies pursuing debt
collection with the imprimatur of attorneys general offices.77 There are
also increasing pushes to privatize roads, 78 sewage systems, 79 postal
delivery, 80 and Amtrak. 81 Indeed, debates over privatizing Medicare and
Social Security took center stage in the 2012 presidential contest.82
There has also been a privatization push in the environmental
realm. For example, the National Park Service and other public spaces
are privatizing operations. 83 The land does not become private, but
private companies take over tasks like collecting fees, cleaning
bathrooms, and running campsites. In fact, this is not new for the
National Park Service, which has had contracts with private companies
to conduct tours, run lodges, and other operations since Yellowstone first
opened its gates. 84 The U.S. Forest Service has also worked with private
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/08/21/10706/privatization-fails-nebraska-tries-again-reformchild-welfare.
77. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, In Prosecutors, Debt Collectors Find a Partner, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 15, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/16/business/in-prosecutors-debtcollectors-find-a-partner.html (often threatening jail time for defaulters who refuse to pay).
78. James E. Miller, A Glimpse of What Privitized Roads Could Look Like, AM. THINKER
(May
20,
2012),
http://www.americanthinker.com/2012/05/a_glimpse_of_what_privatized_roads_could_look_like.ht
ml; Michael Cooper, States Consider Privatizing Roads, N.Y. TIMES. (Apr. 1, 2009). The
discussion is lively in right-leaning blogs. See, e.g., Bart Frazier, Private Roads Work,
LENROCKWELL.COM (Jan. 2, 2009), http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig6/frazier3.html; Tad
DeHaven, Privatizing Roads, CATO INST. (Dec. 14, 2010, 10:20 AM), http://www.cato-atliberty.org/privatizing-roads/.
79. Joan Gralla, Update 2-NY Nassau County Budget Delays Sewer Deal, Not Refunds,
REUTERS, (Sept. 18, 2012, 6:51 pm EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/18/usa-nassaubudget-idUSL1E8KIFFC20120918.
80. George F. Will, Privatize the Nation’s Mail Delivery, Opinion, WASH. POST (Nov. 25,
2011),
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/privatize-the-nations-maildelivery/2011/11/23/gIQAe2J7wN_story.html.
81. Keith Laing, GOP Unveils Plan to Privatize Amtrak, THE HILL (June 15, 2011, 12:48 PM
ET), available at http://thehill.com/blogs/transportation-report/railroads/166601-gop-unveils-planto-privatize-rail-service-provided-by-amtrak.
82. See Laura Meckler, Obama Vows to Fight ‘Privatizations,’ WALL ST. J. (Sept. 8, 2012,
10:27
PM
ET),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443819404577639742331612420.html.
83. George Cameron Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman, Concessions Law and Policy in the
National Park System, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 729 (1997).
84. Richard A. Bartlett, The Concessionaires of Yellowstone National Park: Genesis of a
Policy, 1882-1892, 74 PAC. NW. Q. 2 (1983); MARK DANIEL BARRINGER, SELLING YELLOWSTONE:
CAPITALISM AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF NATURE (2002); Devin Boyle, Should National Parks be
RIDGE
OUTDOOR
MAGAZINE
(Nov.
2012),
available
at
Privatized?,
BLUE
http://www.blueridgeoutdoors.com/eco/news-issues/should-national-parks-be-privatized/. See also
Dru Stevenson, My Response to the Question: Should National Parks be Privatized, PRIVATIZATION
BLOG (Sep. 12, 2012), http://www.privatizationblog.com/2012/09/my-response-to-question-shouldnational.html; NPS Commercial Services, NAT’L PARK SERV., www.concessions.nps.gov (last
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concessionaires for decades and allowed private timber and mining
companies as well as recreation outfitters and ski facilities to operate on
its lands. 85
Privatization is also occurring in the framework of environmental
laws and regulations. We see it both in traditional and neoliberal
approaches to environmental protection. For example, the private role is
evident in market-based schemes like cap and trade programs or land
Such programs
conservation through conservation easements.86
establish rules and incentives and hope that market mechanisms will
result in environmental protection. Negotiated Rulemaking (or reg-neg)
also enables private parties (particularly regulated industries) to play a
significant role in establishing, implementing, and enforcing
environmental programs. 87
Traditional command-and-control environmental regulations are the
quintessential example of government-driven policies overseen by a
complex public bureaucracy, but even these programs involve private
actors in significant ways. 88 We see it in the levels and standards that
regulated entities must comply with. 89 Private organizations are often
involved in this process, sometimes explicitly by responding to a request
visited Mar. 16, 2013).
85. See Coggins & Glicksman, supra note 83, at 738. In fact, the U.S. Forest Service is now
facing litigation from a nonprofit organization known as BARK that argues that the Forest Service’s
grants to concessionaires violates federal law (the Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act) by
resulting in the Forest Service charging excessive fees for recreational use of lands. Specifically,
BARK argues that federal law prevents charging any fees for use of undeveloped land and can only
charge fees that are justified by the expenses of the facilities provided (e.g., bathrooms, visitor
centers, parking lots). Complaint, Bark v. U.S. Forest Service, Civ. No. 12-1506 (D.C. Dist.
Ct.),available at http://www.cnsenvironmentallaw.com/2012/09/14/Privatize.pdf.
86. See, e.g., Benjamin Cashore, Legitimacy and the Privatization of Environmental
Governance: How Non-State Market Driven (NSMD) Governance Systems Gain Rule-Making
Authority, 15 GOVERNANCE 503 (2002); Amy Wilson Morris, Easing Conservation? Conservation
Easements, Public Accountability and Neoliberalism, 39 GEOFORUM 1215 (2008).
87. Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997); Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The Actual
Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 32 (2000).
88. Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When is Command-And-Control Efficient?
Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for
Environmental Protection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 887 (1999) (describing common depictions of
command-and-control instruments); David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic
Incentive Program?: Replacing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289 (1998) (describing intersections between command-and-control pollution
regulations and economic incentive programs); Edward Balleisen & David Moss, Introduction, in
GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 4 (Balleisen & Moss eds.
2009).
89. Jennifer Clapp, The Privatization of Global Environmental Governance: ISO 14000 and
the Developing World, 4 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 295 (1998).
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to establish standards. 90
This occurs throughout environmental
regulatory processes because agencies are somewhat dependent on the
regulated industries for information about the pollution their discharge
and the possible technological ways to address the problem. 91 In some
cases, public agencies adopt already-established voluntary standards. 92
Doing so may be expedient, but it also enables the private firms to set
their own ground rules. 93
Command and control regulations also rely significantly on private
participation in implementation.94 There are self-reporting procedures
for permits and self-identification for coverage. 95 Agencies lack the
resources necessary to do independent research about regulated interests
and may not have the resources to pursue rule violations. But
privatization necessarily entails going beyond mere instances of private
organizations cooperating with public entities or with each other. 96 The
private actors actually have significant implementation and policymaking roles.
Multiple aspects of environmental regulation have been outsourced
to citizens and private organizations.97 Of particular interest here is the
use of private organizations for carrying out essential parts of
environmental permitting programs. Private actors are involved in
permits at different levels. They may determine permit terms, enforce
permit terms, interpret permit terms, or even alter permits. For example,
citizen suit provisions within the Clean Water Act and the Endangered
Species Act work toward privatizing enforcement of permitting

90. Robert Falkner, Private Environmental Governance and International Relations:
Exploring the Links, 3 GLOBAL ENVTL. POLITICS 72, 79 (2003).
91. Freeman, supra note 70, at 828 (voicing concerns with private standard-setting).
92. See, e.g., Spencer Henson & John Humphrey, The Impacts of Private Food Safety
Standards on the Food Chain and on Public Standard-Setting Processes, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS
COMMISSION
32ND
SESSION
24-25
(2009),
available
at
http://originwww.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/Codex_al32_09Dbe.pdf (describing government adoption of food safety
policies); Falkner, supra note 90, at 76.
93. Freeman, supra note 70, at 829.
94. See id. at 835-36 (referring to the command-and-control as a “co-regulatory” regime
because of the extensive involvement of private actors).
95. See, e.g., John K. Stranlund & Carlos A. Chavez, Efficient Enforcement of a Transferable
Emissions Permit System with a Self-Reporting Requirement, 18 J. REGULATORY ECON. 113 (2000);
Sarah L. Stafford, Should You Turn Yourself In? The Consequences of Environmental Self-Policing,
26 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 305 (2007)
96. Falkner, supra note 90, at 73.
97. See, e,g., Miriam Seifter, Rent-A-Regulator: Design and Innovation in Privatized
Governmental Decisionmaking, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1091 (2006) (describing the hiring of private
environmental compliance officers).
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programs under those laws. 98 This can also be a form of privatization
for monitoring and compliance efforts. While citizen-suit provisions
seek to work in tandem with (as opposed to at odds with) public
enforcement, they bring private actors into the framework of the law. 99
Where public agencies are lacking capacity for enforcement, these
private attorneys general provisions may play pivotal roles in forwarding
the goals of environmental protection.100 The Endangered Species Act
goes even further to privatize endangered species protection. Not only
does the statute have a citizen suit provision for enforcing its permit
program, but it also involves citizens in the decision of which species to
protect. 101
As explained above, many environmental laws involve the use of
permitting programs to limit environmentally destructive activities. In
carrying out these programs, government agencies have turned to private
organizations for assistance. The mitigation procedures for both
wetlands and endangered species protection outlined above rely heavily
on private actors for their success.
B.

Examples

Private actors pop up in mitigation programs in a few places.
Permit applicants hire firms to help with environmental review of
mitigation programs or to help design mitigation projects. 102 They hire
ecological restorationists and conservation biologists to enhance and
create wetlands and other desired ecological features. 103 This is not
surprising or worrisome. We anticipate that permit applicants will not
have the expertise needed to perform these activities and yet we place
responsibility for their completion on the applicants. Such actions and
plans are still subject to public review and government agencies confirm
that the proposals will make ecological sense and yield desired

98.
99.

33 U.S.C. 1365 (West 2013); 16 USC § 1540(g) (West 2013).
James R, May, Now More Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, 10
WIDENER L. REV. 1, 6 (2003).
100. Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary
Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833 (1985).
101. See Berry J. Brosi & Eric G.N. Biber, Citizen Involvement in the U.S. Endangered
Species Act, 337 SCI. 802 (2012) (explaining that citizen petitions are more likely to cover
biologically threatened species than those species selected by the government agency).
102. See, e.g., ECOSYSTEM RENEWAL,
http://www.ecosystemrenewal.com/company/index.shtml
(providing
services
designing
compensatory mitigation projects).
103. See, e.g., CARDNO JFNEW, http://www.cardnojfnew.com/ (wetlands restoration
consultants).
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mitigation outcomes.
There are a few places where the role of the private actors goes
beyond carrying out government-approved actions and starts to look like
environmental policy making. In some cases, actions that look like
category one (carrying out government-approved tasks) morph into
category two (policy making). This section offers two examples where
private actors working in the mitigation realm may have greater power
and reach than government agencies or the public realize. First, I
examine private mitigation banks working to protect both wetlands and
endangered species habitat. While governed by mitigation banking
agreements and numerous laws, mitigation bank operators and
subsequent landowners shape the projects more than many realize.
Second, I look at the role played by land trusts. Land trusts are nonprofit
land conservation organizations and may take part in mitigation projects
in multiple ways. 104 Of particular note is the role they play in overseeing
conservation easements preserving compensatory mitigation lands.
These perpetual land-use restrictions are governed by agreements
between the landowners and land trusts with minimal or absent
government involvement and oversight. I explain both mitigation banks
and land trust mitigation below to set the stage for discussing concerns
with private actors and mitigation tasks that appears in the following
section.
1. Mitigation Banks
Mitigation programs under both the Clean Water Act and the
Endangered Species Act often enable permit applicants to meet their
mitigation obligations by purchasing credits from an approved
mitigation bank. 105 Mitigation banks are areas that have been set aside
to protect a particular natural resource, such as wetlands, streams, or
endangered species habitat. 106 They are designated for restoration,
enhancement, and preservation of those natural resources.107 Sometimes
104. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, WETLAND AND STREAM MITIGATION: A HANDBOOK FOR LAND
TRUSTS (2012), available at http://www.elistore.org/Data/products/d22_04.pdf.
105. Morgan M. Robertson, The Neoliberalization of Ecosystem Services: Wetland Mitigation
Banking and Problems in Environmental Governance, 35 GEOFORUM 361, 363 (2004); Federal
Guidance, supra note 46 (describing wetland mitigation banking); Bonnie, supra note 1 (describing
conservation banking).
106. Federal Guidance, supra note 46 (describing wetland mitigation banking); Bonnie, supra
note 1 (describing conservation banking); Rebecca Lave, Morgan M. Robertson, & Martin W.
Doyle, Why You Should Pay Attention to Stream Mitigation Banking, 26 ECOLOGICAL
RESTORATION 287 (2008) (describing stream mitigation banking).
107. Federal Guidance, supra note 46.
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they are also sites for creation or enhancement of resources.108
Wetlands mitigation banks seek to provide for the replacement of
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of wetlands resources
prior to the “unavoidable” impacts permitted under Section 404.109 The
number of wetland mitigation banks is large and growing. The Army
Corps of Engineers began approving mitigation banks in the late
1980s. 110 From 1995 to 2005, there was a 780% increase in the number
of banks. 111 In 2005, there were 405 mitigation banks in thirty-one
states (with twenty of those sold out). 112 That number has more than
doubled since. As of January 2010, there were more than 950 wetland
and stream mitigation banks, covering over 960,000 acres.113
Habitat conservation banks protect habitats for listed and at-risk
species. 114 As off-site mitigation, these banks exist to offset adverse
impacts to species occurring elsewhere.115 Sometimes it is a habitat that
has been designated as “critical.” 116 Conservation banking has had a
shorter history than wetland banking, with the first governmental
approval coming in the early 1990s. 117 This aligns with the shorter
history of habitat conservation planning (occurring first in the late 1980s
with San Bruno Mountain in California) versus wetlands mitigation
under the Clean Water Act (spurred by the 1977 amendments to the
Clean Water Act). 118 As of January 2009, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service approved over ninety conservation banks, covering over 90,000

108. Kelly Chinners Reiss, Erica Hernandez, & Mark T. Brown, Evaluation of Permit Success
in Wetland Mitigation Banking: A Florida Case Study, 29 WETLANDS 907, 907 (2009).
109. Federal Guidance, supra note 46.
110. Deborah L. Mead, History and Theory: The Origin and Evolution of Conservation
Banking, in CONSERVATION AND BIODIVERSITY BANKING: A GUIDE TO SETTING UP AND RUNNING
BIODIVERSITY CREDIT TRADING SYSTEMS 9, 10 (Nathaniel Carroll, Jessica Fox, & Ricardo Bayon
eds. 2008).
111. Reiss et al., supra note 108, at 908.
112. Id. A sold out bank is one where all of the credits have already been disbursed to permit
applicants and no further mitigation credit can come from the bank.
113. WETLAND BANKING, NAT’L MITIGATION BANKING ASS’N, available at
http://www.mitigationbanking.org/pdfs/2010-wetlandconservation.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2012).
114. Fox & Nino-Murcia, supra note 30; Bonnie, supra note 1.
115. WETLAND BANKING, supra note 113.
116. Kalyani Robbins, Recovery of an Endangered Provision: Untangling and Reviving
Critical Habitat Under the Endangered Species Act, 58 BUFF L. REV. 1095, 1100 (2010)
(explaining the definition and role of critical habitat).
117. WETLAND BANKING, supra note 113.
118. Lindell L. Marsh, Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act: A New
Paradigm for Conserving Biological Diversity, 8 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 97, 98 (1994) (describing the
San Bruno Mountain project and the beginning of habitat conservation planning); Hough &
Robertson, supra note 12, at 17.
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acres of habitat. 119 Federal guidelines issued in 2003 outline the rules
for bank operation. 120
Mitigation banks can be owned and operated by public or private
entities. 121 Early banks were public, often operated by state departments
of transportation to consolidate mitigation for their own projects. 122
Private mitigation bank operators can be either for-profit companies or
nonprofit conservation organizations.123 Like the early public banks, the
first private wetlands mitigation bank was created to provide credits for
the bank owner. 124 When the bank had excess credits, it sought (and
received) permission to sell those credits to others. 125 Today, the
majority of mitigation banks are private entrepreneurial ventures.126
Where privately held, mitigation bank land must be encumbered by a
conservation easement requiring the land to remain undeveloped and
protected for that resource.127 Mitigation banks are governed by federal,
119. Conservation
Banks,
NAT’L
MITIGATION
BANKING
ASS’N,
http://www.mitigationbanking.org/conservationbanks/index.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2013).
120. Guidance for the Establishment, Use, and Operation of Conservation Banks, 68 Fed. Reg.
24,753 (Dep’t of Interior May 8, 2003); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE
SERVICE, GUIDANCE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT, USE, AND OPERATION OF CONSERVATION BANKS
(May 2, 2003), available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esalibrary/pdf/Conservation_Banking_Guidance.pdf.
121. Morgan Robertson & Nicholas Hayden, Evaluation of a Market in Wetland Credits:
Entrepreneurial Wetland Banking in Chicago, 22 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 636, 638 (2008).
122. Hough & Robertson, supra note 12, at 24.
123. The Nature Conservancy is an example of a nonprofit land conservation organization that
owns and operates mitigation banks. See Mississippi: Old Fort Bayou Mitigation Bank: About, THE
NATURE
CONSERVANCY,
http://www.nature.org/ourinitiatives/regions/northamerica/unitedstates/mississippi/placesweprotect/
old-fort-bayou-mitigation-bank.xml (last visited Dec. 20, 2012). The Nature Conservancy
sometimes enters into joint partnerships with private banking companies or funders and sometimes
with public agencies. David Urban, Michael Dennis, & Richard Martin, Workshop at the Land
Trust Alliance Rally in Salt Lake City, Utah: Land Trusts’ Interaction with Mitigation Banking: A
Perspective
From
Both
Sides
(Oct.
1,
2012)
(description
available
at
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/training/rally/rally-2012-salt-lake-city/rally-2012-workshop-grid)
(last visited Sept. 1, 2013) (discussing partnership between The Nature Conservancy and Ecosystem
Investment Partners); Mississippi: Red Creek Consolidated Mitigation Bank, THE NATURE
CONSERVANCY,
http://www.nature.org/ourinitiatives/regions/northamerica/unitedstates/mississippi/placesweprotect/
red-creek-consolidated-mitigation-bank.xml (last visited Dec. 20, 2012) (describing mitigation bank
co-sponsored by TNC and the Mississippi Department of Transportation).
124. See Mead, supra note 110, at 9-10.
125. Hough & Robertson, supra note 12, at 24.
126. See id. at 25 (giving statistics for wetland mitigation banks).
127. Memorandum from Director of Fish and Wildlife Service to Regional Directors, Regions
1-7, Manager, California Nevada Operations 2-3 (May 2, 2003), available at
http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/Conservation_Banking_Guidance.pdf; see also
Reiss et al., supra note 108, at 913 (noting that wetland mitigation banks on public lands do not
have conservation easements).
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state, and local laws. 128 For banks to qualify for participation in federal
mitigation schemes under the Clean Water Act or Endangered Species
Act, they must operate under a Mitigation Bank Agreement and follow
the federal guidelines for mitigation banking. 129 On top of these federal
rules, there may be state laws governing the banks or local land-use and
zoning ordinances that come into play. 130
Mitigation banks appear superior to individual projects because
they are usually on larger parcels that are contiguous to other protected
areas. 131 The protection is not done on an ad-hoc basis, and land
protection can occur in advance of permitted projects. 132 Mitigation
banks enable consolidation of resources and planning and expertise. 133
It is easier to oversee and manage banks. 134 Arguably, efficiency is
increased with their use.
While mitigation banks may be desirable because they protect land
pre-permit issuance, it may be that the presence of mitigation banks
makes the approval of permits all the more likely. That is, the banks
may facilitate development and encourage the use of preservation as
mitigation because of the ease of purchasing mitigation bank credits
without needing to think critically about an individual project or
ecosystem. Mitigation banks have enabled the conversion of thousands
of acres of wetlands and endangered species habitats, facilitating
development of those lands.
The public has a strong interest in ensuring that mitigation banks
are worthwhile. Several reviews of mitigation projects in general and
mitigation banking in particular present worrisome pictures. When
considering mitigation banking, we can look at whether they have been
successful ecologically and administratively. Ecologically, we would
hope to see mitigation banks providing meaningful resources that
compensate for lost ecosystem functions. This is challenging to assess
as it involves in-depth investigation of a bank’s ecology and keeping
track of it over time. Administratively, we can assess whether banks
have complied with rules regarding monitoring and reporting. These
aspects of the program interact. Where there is a lack of administrative
oversight, ecological outcomes may suffer.

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See Memorandum from Director of Fish and Wildlife Service, supra note 127, at 11.
See, e.g., id. at 2-3 (describing process for conservation banks).
See, e.g., id. at 3 (describing California’s state requirements for banks).
Reiss et al., supra note 108, at 907.
Id. at 908.
Id. at 907-08.
Id. at 908.
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To begin with, it can be hard to determine the state of banking
success because of the difficulty in accessing information about the
banks. Availability of permits and other documents vary greatly by
mitigation bank. 135 Additionally, studies of wetland mitigation banks
have noted that monitoring reports are not always available for
review. 136 This represents an administrative failure. Mitigation projects
appear to often fail to comply with permit conditions. 137 There are
pervasive problems with monitoring, submitting reports, and performing
long-term maintenance.138 Additionally, some banks fail to implement
procedures outlined in their permits or mitigation banking agreements. 139
Public agencies overseeing banks have not always kept up with
their obligations either.
A 2005 study by the Government
Accountability Office revealed that the Army Corps of Engineers had
inadequately performed its oversight duties. 140 In fact, the GAO
explained that, “Until the Corps takes its oversight responsibilities more
seriously, it will not know if thousands of acres of compensatory
mitigation have been performed and will be unable to ensure that the
section 404 program is contributing to the national goal of no net loss of
wetlands.” 141 But there does appear to be greater confidence with
banking than with permit-driven projects as it is easier for the Corps to
monitor banks, and in some areas bank operators can develop
relationships (and trust) with the government agencies that oversee
them. 142
Ecologically, things are also worrisome. Several studies of wetland
mitigation conclude that mitigation projects have failed to replace lost
wetland functions even where the overall number of acres under
protection has risen. 143 Some studies indicate numbers actually improve

135.
136.
137.

Id. at 909.
Id. at 909.
Rebecca L. Kihslinger, Success of Wetland Mitigation Projects, 30 NAT’L WETLANDS
NEWSLETTER no. 2 p.14 (2008).
138. See Mitsch & Wilson, supra note 25; Whigham, supra note 25; Hough & Robertson,
supra note 12, at 24; Robertson, supra note 105 at 363.
139. Kihslignger, supra note 137, at 15 (citing Michigan study where only twenty-nine percent
of permits examined implemented the required amount of mitigation measures).
140. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-898, WETLANDS PROTECTION:
CORPS OF ENGINEERS DOES NOT HAVE AN EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT APPROACH TO ENSURE THAT
COMPENSATORY
MITIGATION
IS
OCCURRING
(2005),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-898 [hereinafter GAO-05-898]; see also Sakyi, supra note
42, at 1035.
141. GAO-05-898, supra note 140, at 27.
142. Hough & Robertson, supra note 12, at 25.
143. Kihslignger, supra note 137, at 14.
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for mitigation banks as opposed to permittee-driven projects, but the
overall results are still dismaying. 144 Other scientists argue that
ecological outcomes are no better with mitigation banks than with other
mitigation strategies.145
Current policies encourage the use of mitigation banks. While
there may be both administrative and ecological benefits to this decision,
it puts a lot reliance on private actors to carry out public permitting
programs. While some mitigation banks are publicly operated, many are
privately owned by either nonprofit organizations like The Nature
Conservancy or for-profit companies. These for-profit or entrepreneur
(or enviroprenuer as PERC labels them) 146 operators are increasingly
running the bulk of mitigation banks. 147
Mitigation banking shifts administrative burdens to private entities
specializing in the field. When a permittee purchases credits from a
mitigation bank, it is the bank that assumes responsibility for the
mitigation project. 148 It is not clear what happened if the mitigation
banks fail to achieve their ecological goals. The permit will not be
revoked because the permittee has satisfied her commitment by
purchasing the credits. But there is little oversight, especially after
banks are sold out. For example, some bank operators transfer the land
after the bank is established and sold-out. 149 Now neither the permittee
nor the bank operator is involved with the permit-required mitigation.
There is no system to ensure that mitigation projects are performing at
the promised level of efficiency, and it is not clear what would happen if
they were not. There is a heavy reliance on good faith of bank
144. Id. at 14.
145. Hough & Robertson, supra note 12, at 25.
§
ENV’T
RESEARCH
CTR.,
http://perc.org/programs/perc146. PROP.
enviropreneurs/enviropreneur-institute (last visited Dec. 21, 2012); Q&A with Enviropenuer Kelly
Sands Siragusa On Conservation Banking, PERC: THE PERCOLARTOR (THE PERC BLOG),
http://perc.org/blog/qa-enviropreneur-kelly-sands-siragusa-conservation-banking (last visited Mar.
16, 2013).
147. Mark Landry, Antje Siems, Gerald Stedge & Leonard Shabman, Applying Lessons
Learned from Wetlands Mitigation Banking to Water Quality Trading 4-9 (White Paper Prepared
for
the
Environmental
Protection
Agency
2005),
available
at
http://www.eli.org/pdf/wqtforum/LanSiemStedShab05.pdf.
148. Id. at 6 (explaining that permittees are no longer responsible for the success of mitigation
programs where they have purchased credits from a bank—in contrast to permitee-driven projects
where they retain such responsibility).
149. See, e.g., Panzners Donate Living Laboratory to UA, http://www.uakron.edu/im/onlinenewsroom/news_details.dot?newsId=4f2fd318-c44b-4183-a1c23f977e4b974e&crumbTitle=Panzners%20donate%20living%20laboratory%20to%20UA
(describing donation of sold-out wetland mitigation bank land to the University of Akron who now
bears the burden of protecting the wetland ecosystem at a high level of functionality).
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operators. 150
As operators of the mitigation banks, private actors have a lot of
control over what lands to protect and how to protect them. While the
banks must be certified, without adequate (and continual) oversight, the
bank operators make the decisions regarding what types of ecological
restoration to do. 151 They can also determine the fate of the bank after
the credits have all been sold. In these ways, bank operators play a more
important role in shaping mitigation projects than regulators do. What
first appeared a ministerial task shifts to policy-making as these private
actors determine the contours, rules, and future of natural resource
conservation.
2. Land Trusts and Conservation Easements
Many public agencies encourage mitigation banks, but even more
call upon the power of land trusts and conservation easements. 152 Land
trusts are nonprofit land conservation organizations. 153 Among their
land conservation strategies are holding fee simple title and conservation
easements over property that they have identified as worthy of
protection. 154 Some land trusts also work with public agencies to
monitor and manage lands owned by others. 155 An even smaller number
operate mitigation banks.156
Land trusts often hold conservation easements associated with
compensatory mitigation.157 These exacted conservation easements are
created to satisfy mitigation requirements in numerous laws including
local land-use ordinances, state laws protecting natural resources, and
150. Sakyi, supra note 42, at 1036.
151. See generally MITIGATION BANKING: THEORY AND PRACTICE 37-54 (David Salvesen,
Lindell L. Marsh, Douglas R. Porter eds., 1996) (describing the mitigation banking process).
152. See, e.g., Jessica Owley & Stephen Tulowiecki, The Future of Private Forests:
Conservation Easements and the Forest Legacy Program, 33 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 47,
71 (2012) (discussing the role of land trusts in the Forest Legacy Program); Jessica Owley, Use of
Conservation Easements by Local Governments, in GREENING LOCAL GOVERNMENT 237 (Patricia
Salkin & Keith Hirokawa eds. 2012) [hereinafter Owley, Use of Conservative Easements]
(discussing conservation easement use by local governments); Christopher Serkin, Entrenching
Environmentalism: Private Conservation Easements over Public Land, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 341,
343-45 (2010) (providing example of conservation easement use by the town of Marlboro).
153. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, LAND TRUSTS, http://www.landtrustalliance.org/land-trusts (last
visited Dec. 21, 2012).
154. See, e.g., Owley, Use of Conservative Easements, supra note 152, at 244-46 (describing
conservation easement holdings of the Town of Dunn in Wisconsin and New York City).
155. Owley & Tulowiecki, supra note 152, at 89-90.
156. See, e.g., supra note 123.
157. See, e.g., Building Indus. Ass’n v. Cnty of Stanislaus, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 467, 478 (2010)
(describing potential role of land trusts in an agricultural land mitigation program).
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federal laws like the permitting programs of Section 404 of Clean Water
Act and Section 10 of the Endangered Species Act.158 As holders of
exacted conservation easements, land trusts have the task of stewarding
an essential element of the environmental regulatory regime. They
oversee and have enforcement responsibility for one of the major
mitigation methods.
Conservation easements are non-possessory rights in land that have
environmental purposes. 159 When a conservation easement burdens land
it either prohibits the landowner from doing something she would have
otherwise been permitted to do or it enables someone else to do
something on her land that she would have been otherwise able to
prohibit. 160 Some conservation easements do both—restricting the
landowner’s behavior and giving the land trust rights or obligations to
conduct activities on the land. The rules for conservation easements
generally come from state law.161 These state laws define rules for
conservation easements including acceptable purposes and holders.162
They also sometimes detail the methods for termination or modification
of the agreements. 163 Almost all states allow government agencies and
nonprofit organizations with conservation goals to hold conservation
easements. 164
Conservation easements look like private contracts but are actually
servitudes, 165 usually burdening land in perpetuity. 166 They are a
favored tool of permit-issuing agencies for preservation components of
compensatory mitigation. For example, where a mitigation program
requires preservation of existing wetlands, agencies require some
guarantee that the preservation will be more than temporary. 167 One way
to do this is to require a permit applicant to purchase credits from a
158. Owley, Exacted Conservation Easements, supra note 69; Jessica Owley, The Emergence
of Exacted Conservation Easements, 84 NEBRASKA L. REV. 1043 (2006); Jessica Owley, The
Enforceability of Exacted Conservation Easements, 36 VERMONT L. REV. 261 (2011).
159. ELIZABETH BYERS & KARIN MARCHETTI PONTE, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT
HANDBOOK, 14-15 (2d ed. 2005).
160. 4 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34A.01
161. Id.
162. 4 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34A.03[1]; Todd D. Mayo, A Holistic Examination of
the Law of Conservation Easements, in PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST,
PRESENT, AND FUTURE 26, 27-31 & 35-40 (Julie Ann Gustanski & Roderick H. Squires eds., 2000).
163. Mayo, supra note 162, at 42-45.
164. California and Oregon add recognized tribes to the list while Arizona does not recognize
the ability of government entities to hold CEs.
165. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES §1.1 cmt. d (2000).
166. Mayo, supra note 162, at 40-42.
167. W.A. Weems & Larry W. Cantor, Planning And Operational Guidelines For Mitigation
Banking For Wetland Impacts, 15 ENVTL IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 197, 206 (1995).
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mitigation bank and then oversee the mitigation bank with various rules
and requirements as discussed above. Another approach is to use
property law tools to restrict potential conflicting land uses on the
preserved wetlands.
Traditional covenants may work in some
jurisdictions and on some properties, but increasingly agencies are
requiring conservation easements. These perpetual restrictions can
circumscribe the use of land and help to ensure that the wetlands remain
wetlands. 168
There are no specific requirements for land trusts holding exacted
conservation easements. State conservation easement laws sometimes
outline the details of what types of organizations are permissible holders,
but these standards are broad and it is not even clear that they would
apply to land trusts operating under a federal scheme. 169 There is no
specification as to size, capacity, or experience of the land trust.170
There are no regulations requiring them to follow certain procedures.
The Land Trust Alliance has created an accreditation program for land
trusts and has its own standards and practices that it urges land trusts to
follow. 171 Accreditation, a form of private standard setting, is voluntary,
and the Alliance is limited in the number of land trust accreditation
applications it can process each year.172 Moreover, the public agencies
governing mitigation processes have not required accreditation.
As with mitigation bank operators, land trusts play a significant role
in federal permitting programs, and this trend is steadily increasing.
Both the number of land trusts (now numbering around 1,700) and the
number of conservation easements is increasing. 173 Conservation
easement use in mitigation projects is well established and trend reversal
seems unlikely. As holders of exacted conservation easements, land
168. Perhaps this is overstating the ability of conservation easements. They can seek to
prevent land uses that would conflict with wetlands, but few conservation easements include
affirmative obligations or active management. See Jessica Owley, Conservation Easements at the
Climate Change Crossroads, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 199 (2011). Where wetlands are at
risk due to climate change or offsite actions, conservation easements will not be able to ensure that
the wetland remains a wetland, only that property owners do not drain or fill the wetland directly.
169. See Owley, Exacted Conservation Easements, supra note 69, at 54.
170. See Owley & Tulowiecki, supra note 152, at 89-90.
171. Accreditation, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE,
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/training/accreditation (last visited Jan. 22, 2013).
172. Getting Accredited, LAND TRUST ACCREDITATION COMM’N,
http://www.landtrustaccreditation.org/the-process (last visited Jan. 22, 2013).
173. Katie Change, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE & LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POLICY, 2010
NATIONAL
LAND
TRUST
CENSUS
(Nov.
16,
2011),
available
at
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/land-trusts/land-trust-census/national-land-trust-census-2010/2010final-report (indicating that there may be some leveling off in the number of land trusts while the
number of acres of land protected and number of conservation easements contains to increase).
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trusts play a fundamental role in shaping mitigation programs. There are
even fewer rules governing conservation easement use than governing
mitigation banks. It is common for permits to require conservation
easements without detailing where the conservation easement will be,
who will hold it, or what its terms will be. Public agencies rarely
maintain a legal interest in the conservation easements (by becoming coholders or third-party enforcers for example).
Even where permits include conservation easement details, the land
trusts remain in control of the mitigation. Unlike the situation with
mitigation banks, there are no requirements for monitoring reports or
continued public oversight. Presumably the land trusts have a free hand
in amending, terminating, and enforcing the conservation easements.
While accreditation repercussions or obligations related to tax or
charitable trust law maintain checks on the land trusts, the environmental
laws (and the environmental permitting agencies) do not have a voice in
key decisions regarding the conservation easements. In fact, the land
trusts’ power to shape the conservation easement boundaries and rules
means that they have the power to shape mitigation policy.
C.

Benefits of Private Mitigation Programs

The above outline of private mitigation programs already indicates
where some concerns relating to this form of privatization might emerge.
There are, however, many strengths that private actors can bring to the
table. For example, private conservation organizations may have greater
expertise in land conservation techniques, may be able to operate more
quickly and flexibly, and may have motivation to find innovative ways
to increase land protection.174
Land trusts and mitigation bank operators work closely with the
land and may have sophisticated understandings of the parcels on which
they operate. Land trust staff, for example, is often composed of longThey may have even better
standing community members. 175
understanding of local weather patterns and ecological features than the
public agencies. In particular, they might have superior knowledge of
174. Starr, supra note 71, at 129 (explaining that local contractors develop knowledge and
expertise associated with their areas of operation).
LAND
TRUST,
175. See,
e.g.,
Land
Trust
Staff,
DESCHUTES
http://www.deschuteslandtrust.org/about-us/staff (displaying land trust staff profiles demonstrating
long term involvement in the local community) (last visited Jan. 4, 2013); Staff, SOLANO LAND
TRUST, http://www.solanolandtrust.org/Staff.aspx (last visited Jan. 4, 2013) (same); Flathead Land
LAND
TRUST,
FLATHEAD
LAND
TRUST,
Trust
Staff,
FLATHEAD
http://www.flatheadlandtrust.org/about%20us/staff.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2013) (same).
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local access points and potential struggles (trespassing, dumping, lack of
community support). Moreover, permittees may feel more comfortable
working with private organizations than with government agencies
where relations may be hostile, or permit applicants resentful. 176
Many proponents of privatization assert that it is more efficient to
allow private organizations to take on public duties instead of increasing
government bureaucracy. 177 In conserving land, private agencies may be
able to acquire important parcels quicker and may have access to
additional funding sources. 178 Land trusts can often work quickly to
protect lands in advance of threats. 179 They can harness public support
and acquire large parcels faster than government agencies and
potentially with less local opposition.180
Private organizations may also be able to provide services similar to
those provided by public agencies but at reduced costs. 181 Many land
trusts for example use volunteers for monitoring conservation
easements. 182 Even paid employees may be cheaper than public
employees because of reduced overhead costs including salaries,
benefits, and costs associated with bureaucracies. Some theorists argue,
however, that efficiency arguments are “bogus.” 183 For example,
Buchheit argues that often privately-run systems like schools, hospitals,
and prisons are more costly. 184
Private organizations may be more innovative as well. 185 When it
comes to management decisions regarding the lands, they may have a
freer hand than agencies do to experiment with different land
conservation techniques or rules.
Land trusts could consider
conservation easement amendments or even land swaps. Mitigation
176. EVE ENDICOTT, LAND CONSERVATION THROUGH PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 5
(1993).
177. Louis Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups¸ 51 HARV. L. REV. 201, 212 (1937).
178. ENDICOTT, supra note 176, at 19-21.
179. Id. at 17-22.
180. Id. at 4-5.
181. Many scholars have acknowledged and documented the budgetary constraints on
environmental agencies. See, e.g., JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND
HARD CHOICES 114-15 (1995).
182. Dominic Parker, Cost-Effective Strategies for Conserving Private Land: An Economic
Analysis
for
Land
Trusts
and
Policy
Makers,
PERC
17
(2002),
http://perc.org/sites/default/files/land_trusts_02.pdf.
183. Paul Buchheit, Fives Ways Privatization Degrades America, NATION OF CHANGE (Aug.
13, 2012), available at http://www.nationofchange.org/five-ways-privatization-degrades-america1344864526; see also Starr, supra note 71, at 128-129 (explaining that cost savings do not always
accompany privatization).
184. Buchheit, supra note 183; Starr, supra note 71.
185. Freeman, supra note 70, at 848; Jaffe, supra note 177, at 212.
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banks can experiment with different restoration, creation, and
enhancement techniques in attempts to increase the value of their banks.
Profit-maximizing motives will align with a desire to increase wetland
function and habitat value. This may lead to more innovation and
experimentation than we would expect to see with public agencies that
do not feel the same economic pressure.
D.

Concerns with Private Mitigation

While private actors may have strengths that could improve
environmental outcomes, the concerns regarding their involvement are
substantial. The concerns appear on two fronts. First, there are
theoretical and moral concerns regarding private actors making
mitigation policy. In presenting those concerns, I offer a variety of
examples of how public participation is marginalized, accountability is
questionable and transparency is lacking. Another way to examine the
use of private actors is to consider outcomes. In thinking about the
actual effects of the private actors we may be particularly concerned by
their capacity to carry out their stewardship obligations and their
effectiveness as land restorationists and conservationists.
1. Democratic Legitimacy
Assessing democratic legitimacy calls on us to ask whether the
people exercising the authority are morally authorized to do so.186 Such
an inquiry must begin with examining the authority being exercised.
When contracting out, we need to consider who has the policy-making
authority and who has the day-to-day management. 187 We are likely
more concerned with the first category than the second. Here, we have
private actors making decisions about mitigation. They decide how the
mitigation will be conducted, whether it will be enforced, and how long
it will persist. An operating underlying assumption is that land
conservation and protection of natural resources is an appropriate role
for government, in fact a duty of public agencies. 188 By relying upon
186. PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY PRIVATIZATION OF
GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2007).
187. See Avihay Dorfman & Alon Harel, The Case Against Privatization, PHILOSOPHY & PUB.
AFFAIRS 7-9 (2013 forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2103365 (discussing the
types of decisions private actors make); see also Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political
Accountability, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507, 1513 (2001) (questioning the constitutionality of
some delegations).
188. I make this assumption somewhat blithely here but fully understand that many would not
agree with it. I save that debate for another day, so we can remain focused on the actions of the
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private actors (combined with minimal oversight of those actors),
government agencies contract out a significant part of their
environmental permitting programs.
Alternatively, it could be
democracy enhancing to use private actors.189 Folks may be more likely
to get involved in local groups. They may be more willing to abide by
rules that they helped to establish. Basic principles of democracy
require public participation in the democratic process and accountability
(including review of actions). Assessing levels of participation and
accountability requires some level of reviewability.
a. Public Participation
Citizen participation is often listed as one of the primary elements
of democracy. 190 Citizens participate in environmental permitting
programs through a few different avenues. Initially, they can participate
in the public review processes. Both Section 404 permits and incidental
take permits go through lengthy public review processes. 191 Rules from
the governing statutes as well as the Administrative Procedure Act
require public notice and comment processes for the issuance of any
permits. Additionally, the issuance of a federal permit triggers review
under the National Environmental Policy Act.192
Unfortunately, it is rare for the conservation easements or land
trusts to be subject to such review. Often neither (1) the identity of the
land trusts that will be involved nor (2) the details of the conservation
easements are known at the time the permit is deliberated and discussed.
While some agencies are moving toward including sample conservation
easements in the permits of associated environmental review
documents, 193 the timing of the permit approval process means that some
of the core elements of the agreements escape review. This is less so for
mitigation banks because they are more commonly established before
permit issuance. In such cases, the public may be able to review
private mitigation actors.
189. Freeman, supra note 70, at 848.
190. See, e.g., Democracy for All, STREET LAW, www.streetlaw.org/democlesson.html (last
visited Mar. 19, 2013).
191. 33 C.F.R. § 327 (2013) (describing public hearings and comment procedures applicable
to Section 404 permits, issuance of which triggers NEPA review); HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 66,
at ch. 6.
192. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO NEPA REVIEW:
HAVING YOUR VOICE HEARD 5 (2007); HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 191, at 6-3 (describing NEPA
review in Section 10 permits).
193. See, e.g., Sample Conservation Easement from St. John’s Water Management District, at
http://www.sjrwmd.com/rules/pdfs/consv_easement_corps.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2013).
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mitigation banking agreements or conservation easements burdening
land within banks, but as the agreements are already completed before
permits are issued review processes for those projects are unable to
influence the terms of such agreements or the management of the
mitigation lands. Once mitigation programs are in place, there is no
requirement for public review of any changes to the land or documents.
Citizens can also participate in environmental permitting programs
as public enforcers or whistleblowers. Both the Clean Water Act and the
Endangered Species Act contain citizen suit provisions enabling suits for
permit enforcement. 194 This law enables private individuals (who can
show standing) to enforce wetland fill permits and incidental take
permits. This gets murky with conservation easements though. It is not
clear whom one would bring a citizen suit against. The permittees have
absolved themselves of responsibility through the purchase of mitigation
bank credits or conservation easements. Thus, bringing an action for
permit violations doesn’t really work. It is not clear citizens would have
a cause of action against the private contractors. Particularly if courts
hold that such conservation easements are governed by state
conservation easement statutes, few citizens would be able to challenge
such violations. Indeed, many states limit conservation easement
enforcers to the holder and potentially the state Attorney General.
b. Accountability
Some of the factors that hinder public participation also affect
accountability. Accountability concerns emerge when it appears that the
private contractors are insulated from legislative, executive, and judicial
oversight. 195 This is certainly a concern with private mitigation
enforcers. To begin with, the private actors conducting mitigation and
making mitigation policy are not popularly elected. As revealed above,
it is also infrequent that members of the public even participate in the
choice of public actor (which land trust, which bank) that carries out the
mitigation duty. When we are unhappy with actions by agencies, we can

194. 33 U.S.C. 1365 (2013); 16 U.S.C § 1540(g) (2013).
195. These same accountability concerns also surround agencies themselves. Many
administrative law scholars have discussed concerns of accountability in the so-called “Fourth
Branch” of government. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 70, at n.1; JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED
CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997); Kathleen
Bawn, Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and the
Committee System, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 101 (1997). I am not arguing here that agencies are
perfect, simply that concerns we already have with accountability and democracy are still present
and often increased when private actors are involved.
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react by bringing legal challenges or by voting for new executive
officers or legislative representatives. 196 When unhappy with actions by
private actors, we can try those same avenues, hoping that actions
against public officers and branches will send the message that we are
dissatisfied with the private actors, but that is an attenuated message that
is difficult to convey. 197 And the judicial review options simply seem
absent.
We might also have concerns about contracting out because the
private actors involved are not necessarily expected to serve the public
interest. Public choice theory tells us that bureaucrats rationally pursue
their own interests. 198 Following this theory, private groups will also
work to benefit themselves at the expense of others. This can be in
conflict with ideals of civic republicanism that tells us that government
is supposed to be a moral force for the common good (not a vehicle for
personal gain). 199 A company running a mitigation bank may just be
seeking to engage in a profitable business venture. Their oversight of
the wetlands they are protecting may seek to ensure functioning
wetlands or meet certain requirements simply to meet contractual
requirements not because the company wants to do all it can to protect
wetlands. For land trusts and mitigation banks, their clients are the
landowners and permittees, not the government agencies overseeing the
mitigation programs. This may offer some indication as to motivations
of these private actors. They may be more focused on things like
maximizing profits, making donors happy, and maintaining amiable
relationships with neighbors. Democratic legitimacy and accountability
are strengthened by impartiality. That can be lacking here.
This concern may be lessened for land trusts compared to
entrepreneurial mitigation banks. As nonprofit charitable organizations,
land trusts do have an obligation to support the public interest. Under
many conservation easements statutes, the organizations must have
conservation as one of their core goals or values. 200 In this way, these
organizations have obligations to the public through state laws regarding

196. See Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion,
116 HARV. L. REV. 1229 (2003).
197. Starr, supra note 71, at 125.
198. Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Introduction: A Brief Trajectory of Public
Choice Theory and Public Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 4
(Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010).
199. PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 52 (1997)
(defining liberty in terms of non-domination).
200. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 35-18-1 (2013); FLA. STAT. ch. 704.06(3) (2013).
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charitable organizations. 201 In her work, Jody Freeman suggests that
private organizations may have mechanisms that increase the likelihood
that public interest will be served even if the organizations are private
and thus not subject to typical restrictions that agencies must abide by. 202
Both land trusts and mitigation bank operators are constrained by a host
of laws as well as industry norms. Thus, there are practices and attitudes
governing their work that may be even more effective than agency
oversight. The organizations must be responsive to their members,
boards, and investors. Where nonprofit organizations are involved, we
might have even greater solace as they may not operate in ways simply
designed to maximize profits or client satisfaction. Land trusts also have
organization norms from the Land Trust Alliance and external standards
for charitable organizations that may make them more responsive to the
public interest than the owner of the for-profit wetlands mitigation bank.
c. Transparency
Although both the permits and conservation easements are public
documents, they are not equally easy to track down. Where one can
obtain a permit, it may be difficult to also get a copy of the conservation
easement that embodies the mitigation required in the permit. The
mitigation details may be hidden from view. Thus, we have to overcome
the threshold issue of obtaining information. It is impossible to get
comprehensive information on how and where conservation easements
are being created and whether they are being monitored. An extensive
effort to track conservation easements through online registries, county
recorder office documents, and spatial data in California revealed
piecemeal tracking systems, leading scholars to recommend new
tracking systems that include information on conservation easement
locations, terms, and greater monitoring of the monitors. 203
It can be challenging just to learn when there is a problem. For
example, I examined the Section 10 incidental take permit for San Bruno
Mountain. 204 Examining the associated Habitat Conservation Plan
201. Nancy A. McLaughlin, Extinguishing and Amending Tax-Deductible Conservation
Easements: Protecting the Federal Investment after Carpenter, Simmons, and Kaufman, 13 FLA.
TAX REV. 217, 281 (2012).
202. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
203. Amy Morris & Adena R. Rissman, Public Access to Information on Private Land
Conservation: Tracking Conservation Easements, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1237, 1239, 1281 (2009); see
also James L. Olmsted, The Invisible Forest: Conservation Easement Databases and the End of the
Clandestine Conservation of Natural Lands, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51 (2011) (describing the
need for a transparent, comprehensive, and easy to use conservation easement database).
204. Jessica Owley, Exacted Conservation Easements 146-148 (2005) (unpublished Ph.D.
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reveals references to the developers’ intention to use habitat easements
to meet mitigation needs. 205 The plan did not explain in any detail what
the conservation easements would look like, where they would be
located, or who would hold them. 206 Tracking down those conservation
easements was challenging. Repeated phone calls and emails to the
public agencies, consultants, and developers only unearthed one
conservation easement (even though many acknowledged that
conservation easements were used pervasively in the project).207 Thus,
even where I knew conservation easements were operating, I could not
locate copies of them or learn who held them.
Beyond locating permits and associated mitigation documents, it
can be difficult to determine when permits violations occur. First, if we
can’t find the documents, we have no way of knowing whether the
mitigation programs are being carried out correctly (if at all). Under the
Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water Act, citizens can bring suit
against permit violators (or indeed any violators of the statute).208 But
the struggle of finding the information makes it challenging to learn of
when permit violations occur.
Furthermore, because conservation easements and mitigation bank
practices lack consistency, it can be even harder to assess them. To
understand the mitigation requirements, one must look at each individual
agreement because the terms could be quite different. The permits and
mitigation bank agreements differ by state, by agency office
administering the program, by the private contractor involved.
Additionally, individual landowners and permittees may add other
requirements or provisions. When the conservation easements are
written by different holders and there is no agency guidance or model
conservation easement, there is a lack of consistency in permitting.
Mitigation requirements in permits may effectively vary because of the
nuances and requirements of the different holders involved.
2. Conservation Outcomes
The preceding section presented theoretical concerns with
privatization of mitigation. That is, we have concerns regarding who is
dissertation, Univ. of California, Berekeley) (on file with author) [hereinafter, Owley, dissertation].
205. SAN BRUNO MOUNTAIN HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN. I-3, SAN BRUNO MOUNTAIN
HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT, §V; see Owley, dissertation, supra
note 204, at 148-49.
206. See Owley, dissertation, supra note 204, at 150-55.
207. Id. at 146-48.
208. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2013).
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the appropriate entity to make mitigation policy and there are many
structural reasons that make us worry about the legitimacy of the current
system. An important question though is whether privatization matters
on the ground. 209 Do we see different results when private actors
structure and carrying out conservation programs? What are the actual
conservation outcomes? Unfortunately, because of the problems with
obtaining information about the system, it is hard to assess conservation
outcomes. We can however, examine some of the aspects of these
private organizations to obtain information about their capacity for
successful conservation work.
Capacity concerns abound with land trusts and mitigation banks.
Although many programs require conservation banking agreements,
there are no statutes, regulations, or even agency guidance outlining
acceptable private organizations for these programs. Outside state
conservation easement laws putting constraints on holders, there are no
standards to which they must comply. Many land trusts are run by
volunteers. There are no requirements about volunteer or staff
qualification.
Nothing requires specific expertise or levels of
experience.
Recently, the Land Trust Alliance led an effort to standardize land
trusts by asking their land trust members to adopt the Alliance’s
Standards and Practices and by creating an accreditation program. 210
The environmental permit programs do not require land trusts to have
adopted the Standards and Practices or to be accredited.211 Of course,
self-regulation makes some nervous because there can be a lack of hard
performance standards, little transparency or public involvement, and it
can be hard to monitor the standards set by others.212 Voluntary
209. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Triangulating the Administrative State, 78 CAL. L. REV.
1415, 1425 (1990) (suggesting that the important issue in administrative law is achievement of
public policy goals, not determining and ensuring reviewability).
210. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, LAND TRUST STANDARDS AND PRACTICES, (2004), available at
https://www.landtrustalliance.org/training/sp/lt-standards-practices07.pdf; Accreditation, LAND
TRUST ALLIANCE, http://www.landtrustalliance.org/training/accreditation (last visited April 10,
2013).
211. I take no position on the adequacy or appropriateness of LTA’s Standards and Practices
or accreditation process. I simply point out that even though these external standards have emerged,
the public permitting agencies have not required land trust partners to comply with those standards.
Nor have they set standards for the land trusts either.
212. Deborah L. Rhode & Alice Woolley, Comparative Perspectives on Lawyer Regulation:
An Agenda for Reform in the United States and Canada, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2761, 2775-76
(2012) (discussing concerns with self-regulation in the context of law societies); Hope M. Babcock,
Corporate Environmental Social Responsibility: Corporate “Greenwashing” or a Corporate
Culture Game Changer?, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 52 (2010); Jody Freeman, The Private
Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 647 (2000).
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measures could pose “a serious threat to the legitimacy of environmental
regulation.” 213
Capacity and oversight concerns merge with the issue of
enforcement. Repercussions for lack of enforcement are unclear. What
do we do when private groups are not good at environmental protection?
There are lots of flaws with public actors, but the response is a bit
clearer. We have a general sense of what our legal and political options
are when we don’t think a public agency is doing the right thing, but this
gets harder when we are looking at the actions of a private party. What
happens when the land trust does not enforce the conservation easement?
This may happen by mistake (the land trust does not realize that there is
a violation) or quite consciously. The land trust may decide that the
infractions are not worth the expense of enforcement and litigation. The
land trust may determine that the property is not really that valuable.214
Thus, whether the decision not to enforce is due to a lack of capacity or
is a strategic one, it is not clear what recourses are available when
enforcement does not occur.
A similar issue arises with mitigation banks. Without consistent
study and oversight, it is hard to know whether mitigation banks are
delivering promised ecological benefits. In 2001, the National Resource
Counsel reviewed federal wetlands mitigation and found several
disturbing things. 215 First, there was a high rate of noncompliance with
mitigation plans. 216 The long-term monitoring and management of the
mitigation projects was limited (often with inadequate funding).217
Other studies supported these findings, 218 including a 2005 study from
the Government Accountability Office.219 The GAO study noted that

213. Freeman, supra note 70, at 833.
214. I do not mean to convey that this is something that would happen commonly. Land trusts
tend to be watchful diligent enforcers. In fact, they are likely better at overseeing conservation
easements than public holders are. The point here is that it is not clear what to do when a land trust
does not live up to this ideal (something that would occur infrequently but is still likely to occur).
215. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL (NRC), COMPENSATING FOR
WETLAND LOSSES UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT (2001).
216. Id. at 6; Kihslinger, supra note 137, at 14.
217. NRC, supra note 215, at 138.
218. See, e.g., D. J. Spieles, Vegetation Development in Created, Restored, and Enhanced
Mitigation Wetland Banks of the United States, 25 WETLANDS 51-63 (2005). See also R. Eugene
Turner, Ann M. Redmond, & Joy B. Zedler, Count It by Acre of Function—Mitigation Adds Up to
Net Loss of Wetlands, NAT’L WETLANDS NEWSLETTER (Environmental Law Institute, Washington
D.C.)
vol.
23, no. 60, 2001, at 5, available at
http://ftp.epchc.org/EPC_Wetlands_FTP/Hart/Imp%20Comp%20Mit%20Tampa%20Bay%20Water
sheds/Literature/Ck081-ch18.pdf.
219. GAO-05-898, supra note 140, at 27.
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the permit performance and success criteria were inadequate.220
Mitigation sites were not well located and there was inadequate agency
support for compliance monitoring, tracking, training, or research. 221
The studies generally demonstrated that projects minimized the
avoidance option (what should have been prong one of a mitigation
program) and jumped to focusing on compensation. 222
It is not clear what a concerned citizen could do upon discovering a
poorly operated mitigation bank. There are no avenues for public
oversight or enforcement.
Land trusts involved with holding
conservation easements on mitigation banks admit that many of them
protect marginal sites and provide little habitat.223 Old mitigation banks
(especially those that have changed ownership) face problems with the
continual maintenance needed to maintain the purported ecological value
of the site.
As I have written elsewhere, we may be able to find some legal
hooks to allow enforcement by government agencies, attorneys general,
or even through citizen suits. 224 An added conundrum is who to enforce
against and what are we enforcing. Are we enforcing the conservation
easement, the mitigation banking agreement, or are we enforcing the
permit? The conservation easement was a requirement of the permit and
incorporated into the permit by reference usually. Is that enough to
make conservation easement terms permit terms? If so, then violation of
the conservation easement could be considered violation of the permit
and enforced by any party that would have the ability to enforce the
permit. But enforcement of the permit may not be entirely satisfying if
the remedies are permit revocation or fines from the permit holder.
Overall, we are left with a lot of uncertainty regarding these private
mitigation operations.
IV. CONCLUSION: HARNESSING STRENGTHS WHILE MINIMIZING HARMS
Current market problems have led to cash-strapped governments.
Public agencies without funding for conservation turn to conservation

220. Id. at 17.
221. See also Reiss et al., supra note 108, at 909 (describing a study in Florida).
222. James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law,
53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 653 (2000); Shirley Jeanne Whitsitt, Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 3 ENVTL.
LAW. 441, 454 (1997); J. B. Ruhl & R. Juge Gregg, Integrating Ecosystem Services into
Environmental Law: A Case Study of Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 365, 370
(2001); Hough & Robertson, supra note 12, at 23.
223. Confidential interviews with Land Trust Staff and Attorneys.
224. See supra notes 152-158.
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easements and mitigation banks as an attractive option. This move is an
unrecognized form of privatization or contracting out. 225 As with other
instances of privatization, we must consider the appropriateness of the
privatization of mitigation and then assess what the appropriate contours
of the privatized actions should be. Some believe privatization is the
solution to all budget woes. Trying to figure out environmental
conservation is challenging and expensive.226 Privatization is not a
magic pill though. 227 We do not suddenly figure out a solution to this
conundrum by handing the task over to private organizations.
The nontrivial concerns raised above concerning democratic
legitimacy, capacity, and enforcement indicate a need to change the
current structure of private mitigation efforts. There are three main
options. First, we could limit the role of private actors, decreasing or
restricting the amount of contracting out. Second, we could treat the
private actors more like public actors applying public information and
accountability laws to these entities. Third, we could explore alternative
routes to enhance accountability and address other concerns.
Who are the legitimate actors here? We assume that public actors
are legitimate while private actors are not. We need to assess what
makes agencies more legitimate than private groups to explore how
private organizations can increase their legitimacy. In assessing how to
proceed, we need to consider whether we should accept the increasing
contracting out as the correct approach, an inevitable but troublesome
concept or something that we can and should prevent. Is private
authority in some realms so ill-advised that we should avoid or minimize
it? Without clear data on conservation outcomes, it is hard to determine
whether privatization of mitigation has been a good thing. Enabling the
use of private entities in addition to public actors appears to increase the
capacity for conservation work (perhaps while simultaneously increasing
the capacity for development and conversion of important ecological
systems).
Even without conservation outcomes, we may feel that mitigation
and permit compliance is an inappropriate duty for agencies to delegate.
There are some tasks that we may feel are best done by government. 228
225. These reasons illustrate why we see contracting out at all levels of government. See,
Freeman, supra note 70, at 820. Indeed local governments with smaller staff and reduced
bureaucracy may be the most likely to seek external assistance for carrying out permitting and
mitigation programs.
226. See generally Daniel J. Fiorino, Rethinking Environmental Regulation: Perspectives on
Law and Governance, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 441 (1999).
227. Starr, supra note 71, at 124.
228. Jody Freeman describes this distaste for public actors as a “visceral skepticism” and
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This argument is particularly persuasive when thinking about
incarceration or the military. 229 Dorfman and Harel argue that there are
some governmental duties where delegation to a private entity is
inappropriate because to do so would affect the fundamental nature of
the action. 230 Indeed, they argue that execution by government is
necessary to yield the “inherently public goods” associated with the
action. 231 Perhaps environmental permitting should also fall under this
category. The permitting program as a form of regulatory policy with
both civil and criminal penalties may seem inappropriate in the hands of
private entities. If we view conservation as an important public duty,
perhaps it is equally important that the public duty be publicly carried
out. This would demonstrate a public backing of land conservation as
something important.
Instead of an outright ban on the involvement of private actors,
perhaps it makes more sense to limit the scope of their actions and
increase oversight. To begin with, we should examine the types of
actions undertaken by public actors. There are fewer concerns with
contracting out ministerial duties than contracting out policy making.
One of the challenges with mitigation is that actions that appear
ministerial have policy-making implications. Striving to limit private
actions to ministerial tasks is a good step forward. However, this is
challenging because there is often a fine line between the two. 232 For
example, where do we classify writing the terms of a conservation
easement? Coming up with the terms could be policy setting as those
terms may determine whether the conservation easements can be
extinguished or the process for changing them. Moreover, it is often
even more difficult to assess which actions belong in the “private”
category and which are “public.” 233
To alleviate some concerns with privatization or contracting out,
others have suggested that we treat private actors more like public

asserts that there is a “cultural resistance to private bodies playing a formal role in regulation.”
Freeman, supra note 70, at 843; Starr, supra note 71, at 133.
229. Many find the idea of private incarceration particularly concerning because of it involves
private actors constraining the liberty of others.
230. Dorfman & Harel, supra note 187, at 1-2.
231. Id. at 3.
232. See Freeman, supra note 70, at 824 (articulating the blurring that occurs between policymaking and implementation functions).
233. See Freeman, supra note 70, at 857; Catherine Donnelly, Privatization and Welfare: A
Comparative Perspective, 5 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 336, 348 (2011) (discussing privatization of
government services in the welfare context); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1369 (2003).
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ones. 234 For example, maybe we make the conservation easements or
mitigation bank agreements and associated conservation easements
subject to notice and comment processes. Perhaps we subject private
mitigation to Administrative Procedure Act-style review.
Extending legal requirements of agencies over private groups doing
public sector work could turn the private organizations into mini
agencies. 235 But this may cause them to lose the very characteristics that
give them strength. This added bureaucracy may not yield intended
goals. Additionally, efforts by the various groups may be slowed by red
tape or some might choose not to participate. Many participants and
supporters of land trusts for example, turn to those groups in part
because they did not like working with public agencies.236 Moreover,
agencies haven’t always shown themselves to be better at getting the job
done. In a study of conservation easement holders in the San Francisco
Bay Area, public agencies holding conservation easements did not
necessarily demonstrate better stewardship and enforcement. 237
Bringing in a public voice through notice and comment and
increasing transparency and access for private mitigators could be the
start of improved processes. Simply increasing public scrutiny could
result in better enforcement and heightened stewardship. Adding some
level of review of private actions would go even further. We could add
levels of agency review rather simply by writing into the mitigation
banking agreements and the conservation easements clear roles for
agencies. For example, including the permitting agencies as third-party
beneficiaries or co-holders on conservation easements would give a clear
route for public involvement at the agency level. We could also see
explicit judicial review enter into the mix. While parties to these
agreements can bring judicial actions regarding enforcement or to
challenge terms, there is no clear mechanisms for agencies or members
234. Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political Accountability, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1507, 1555 (2001) (discussing potential implications of privatization on the Administrative
Procedure Act and the Freedom of Information Act).
235. Starr, supra note 71, at 130 (1987) (describing this shift as a “socialization of private
provision”).
236. John Carleton, Land Trusts: Indispensable Partners in Local Planning, FISH & WILDLIFE
PLANNER (2008), available at http://wdfw.wa.gov/publications/00659/wdfw00659.pdf (last visited
Apr. 10, 2013); Federico Cheever, Public Good and Private Magic in the Law of Land Trusts and
Conservation Easements: A Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1077,
1078 (1996).
237. BAY AREA OPEN SPACE COUNCIL, ENSURING THE PROMISE OF CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS 14 (1999) (studying violations of conservation easements in the San Francisco Bay
Area and finding that, although around seventy-five percent of land trusts monitored their
conservation easements regularly, only thirty percent of public entities did so).
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of the public to do. 238 Uncertainty in state standing requirements along
with a lack of a citizen suit provision for conservation easements
hampers enforcement challenges by anyone other than the signatories to
the agreement. 239
Finally, perhaps there is a third way.
We could reduce
privatization, treat privatization more like public action, or perhaps
explore alternative mechanisms that could offer ways to legitimate
private regimes. This is an area worthy of exploration. It may be that
external forces like market pressures, norms, and threats of public
involvement offer possibilities for improved mitigation results.240 In the
same way that increased transparency can cause private actors to clean
up their act, threats of customer withdrawal or public involvement may
be able to yield better outcomes. 241 For example, as the Internal
Revenue Service increases scrutiny on land trusts 242 and state Attorneys
General 243 pay close attention to private organizations and companies,
land trusts and mitigation bank operators may become more diligent in
their duties.
As understanding of environmental ills increases, so too does the
need for a public response to those problems. Finding ways to bring in
nongovernmental actors could increase the level of environmental
protection, but such moves are beset by privatization concerns. In the

238. There are, however, cases where courts have deemed private actors to be so agency-like
that the courts impose the same review mechanisms on them as public agencies would be subjected
to. These cases have mostly emerged in British courts with a reluctance to follow them by American
Courts. Cf. Regina v. Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers, 1 Q.B. 815, 820-22 (1987) (self-regulatory
panel subject to judicial review) with Jackson v. Met. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974)
(holding that utility was not subject to state action doctrine).
239. Carol Necole Brown, A Time to Preserve: A Call for Formal Private-Party Rights in
Perpetual Conservation Easements, 40 GA. L. REV. 85, 109 (2005).
240. Fiorino, supra note 226, at 448 (describing potential impacts of negative publicity); see
also Freeman, supra note 70, at 849 (suggesting alternative accountability mechanisms).
241. See, e.g., V. REES, HOSTAGES OF EACH OTHER: THE TRANSFORMATION OF NUCLEAR
SAFETY SINCE THREE MILE ISLAND 38-40 (1994) (arguing that self-regulation in the nuclear
industry is successful because if the threat of enforcement from the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission).
TRUST
ALLIANCE,
242. Conservation
Donations
Audits,
LAND
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/policy/tax-matters/audits/conservation-donation-audits (last visited
Jan. 22, 2013); Jason A. Richardson, Increased Scrutiny on Conservation Easement Donations:
How a Crackdown on Tax Fraud by the IRS Could Impact Environmental Protection, 1 ENVT’L &
ENERGY LAW & POL’Y J. 273 (2005).
243. See, e.g., Kimberly Miller, Florida Attorney General Files Suit Against Land Trusts,
Calling Business Unfair and Deceptive, THE PALM BEACH POST (Sep. 26, 2012); Memorandum
from Robert Klein, Chair of Easement Amendment Working Group to the members of the General
Assembly (Jan. 15, 2013), available at
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/reports/2013ExternalReports/285680.pdf.
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end, there are only two things we can ascertain for certain at this point.
First, we need more information about the private mitigation efforts to
understand fully what is going on over time. Are they working well?
Are they doing their job? Even members of the land trust community
question the legitimacy of the mitigation work they are doing. 244
Second, counterintuitively, improved private mitigation must be
accompanied by public investment in the process through increased
oversight and involvement of the private actors.

244.
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